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Constitutional Law.  State v. Beauregard, 198 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2018).  
The admission at trial of physical evidence stemming from an 
inadmissible statement made without proper notice of a defendant’s 
rights, as stated in Miranda v. Arizona,1 does not violate article 1, 
section 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution, which mirrors 
protections granted by the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, so long as the defendant made the statement 
voluntarily. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Sendra Beauregard (Defendant) was indicted by a grand jury 
on counts of first-degree murder and discharging a firearm while 
committing a crime of violence.2  On December 2, 2014, Defendant 
and the victim, Pamela Donohue (Donohue), Defendant’s girlfriend, 
were at Donohue’s apartment.3  Walter Woodyatt (Woodyatt), 
Dononhue’s roommate and former boyfriend, testified that 
Defendant gave him $40 and asked him to buy cigarettes and soda.4  
While returning from the store Woodyatt saw Defendant driving 
away in her vehicle.5  Upon his entry into the apartment Woodyatt 
found Donohue unresponsive and called the police.6 The 
paramedics later arrived and took Donohue’s body to the hospital 
where she was pronounced dead from a single gunshot wound to the 
chest.7  
The next day, detectives met Defendant at her apartment in 
Johnston, Rhode Island, and she agreed to accompany them to the 
police station to discuss Donohue’s death.8  While Defendant was 
1. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. State v. Beauregard, 198 A.3d 1, 3 (R.I. 2018).
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 3–4.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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at the police station officers obtained and executed a search 
warrant at her apartment, but “found nothing of evidentiary 
value.”9  However, detectives located her vehicle parked behind the 
apartment building and towed it to the police station until they 
could obtain a warrant to search it.  Once police had acquired a 
warrant, they searched the vehicle and discovered a spent shell 
casing.10   
During the Defendant’s first interview with the police she was 
given proper notice of her Miranda rights.11  Defendant admitted 
that she and Donohue had gotten into an argument after sending 
Woodyatt for cigarettes, but maintained that Donohue was alive 
when she left.12  When Defendant asked for counsel the police 
terminated the interview and she left the station.13 
Several weeks later, police executed a warrant for Defendant’s 
arrest, and she was booked and processed.14  When Defendant was 
interviewed for the second time she promptly asked about her 
attorney before being read her rights.15  Defendant referred to 
counsel several more times, but the detectives nevertheless 
continued the interview.16  The detectives related the discovery of 
the shell casing, but Defendant denied any knowledge of its 
origin.17  At this point, Defendant became agitated and the 
detectives became briefly argumentative in response.18  During the 
latter half of the interview the detectives misrepresented that the 
shell casing had been matched to the bullet recovered from 
Donohue’s corpse, but the Defendant maintained her innocence.19  
The interview ended when Defendant once again requested 
representation.20 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id.
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Several hours later, with no subsequent interactions with the 
police, Defendant requested to speak with the detectives.21  During 
this third interview a detective told Defendant that the “same rules 
apply,” which she acknowledged, but there was no formal statement 
of her Miranda rights.22  Defendant then confessed to shooting 
Donohue in the chest, and that she had hidden the murder 
weapon.23  She agreed to lead the police to the gun the next 
morning.24  
After arriving at the dump site the next morning, Defendant 
pointed to the general direction where she had hidden the gun, but 
did not accompany the detectives while they searched.25  The 
detectives were subsequently able to locate the gun.26  At no point 
during this “fourth interview” did the police read Defendant her 
Miranda rights.27 
Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress concerning 
the search and seizure of her vehicle, which was denied,28 and 
subsequently, motions to suppress the admission of the statements 
and physical evidence garnered from those statements that were 
obtained in violation of her Miranda rights.29  During the motion 
hearing, the State conceded that Defendant’s Miranda rights had 
been violated with respect to the second, third, and fourth 
interviews, and any statements made during those interviews were 
therefore inadmissible, leaving only the physical evidence attained 
through those statements to be considered.30  Defendant petitioned 
the court to depart from the United States Supreme Court’s holding 
in United States v. Patane, which rendered admissible physical 
evidence attained as a result of inadmissible statements so long as 
the underlying statement was voluntary, and instead follow some 
state decisions where courts found broader protections under state 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 8.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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constitutional provisions.31  The trial court concluded that previous 
Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions “constrained” adherence to 
Patane, and determined that Defendant’s statements were made 
voluntarily.32  As a result, the court also denied the latter motion 
to suppress.33  
At trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and 
discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence.34  She 
was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences, and subsequently 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court).35  
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal of a motion to suppress a confession, the Court first 
defers to the trial justice’s finding of the voluntariness of the 
confession unless clearly erroneous, and second, because of the 
constitutional dimensions of the issue, conducts a de novo review of 
the voluntariness of the confession.36 
First, the Court considered whether it would follow Patane.37  
In Patane, the United States Supreme Court found that Miranda 
rights related exclusively to the Self-Incrimination Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.38  Therefore, 
protections were necessary only to prevent “compelling a criminal 
defendant to testify against himself at trial,” and did not apply to 
“nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary 
statements.”39  The Court noted several states that had rejected 
Patane and recognized broader protections against self-
incrimination in their own constitutions than those afforded under 
the United States Constitution.40  However, protections under 
article I, section 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution41 had been 
31. Id. (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004)).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004)).
39. Id. (quoting Patane, 542 U.S. at 637).
40. Id. at 10.
41. “No person in a court of common law shall be compelled to give self-
criminating evidence.” R.I. Const. art. I, § 13. 
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“interpreted as tantamount to those available under the Federal 
Constitution” for issues arising from Miranda rights.42  Due to their 
strong adherence to interpretations of the federal constitution in 
past decisions, the Court adopted Patane.43   
Next, the Court examined whether Defendant’s statements 
leading to the collection of the murder weapon were voluntary 
under the totality of the circumstances by clear and convincing 
evidence.44  While Defendant submitted her mental illness as 
evidence that she was coerced into making her confession, the Court 
stated that the mental state of the Defendant was immaterial 
unless “emanating from . . . official coercion,” because analysis of a 
potentially coerced confession centers on police conduct, not 
independent psychological pressures.45  The Court examined the 
various recordings of the Defendant’s interviews and determined 
that her statements were voluntary because the tone of the 
interviews was conversational, the detectives gave her various 
items to ensure her comfort, Defendant voluntarily initiated the 
interview in which she confessed, and police did not act coercively 
by waiting nineteen days to arrest her or by misrepresenting the 
connection between the shell casing seized from her car and 
Donohue’s body.46  The Court agreed with the trial justice that 
Defendant’s statements were voluntary, and therefore there was no 
error in allowing the physical evidence emanating from the 
statements to be admitted at trial.47 
Finally, the Court examined the search and seizure of 
Defendant’s vehicle, determining that the trial justice was correct 
in finding the police had probable cause for the search based on the 
reliability of Woodyatt’s statements that Defendant left the scene 
in her vehicle after Donohue was shot.48  Furthermore, the Court 
noted that police had not executed a warrantless search, as would 
42. Beauregard, 198 A.3d at 12 (quoting R.I. Grand Jury v. Doe, 641 A.2d
1295, 1296 (R.I. 1994)). 
43. Id.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986)).
46. Id. at 14–15.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 16.
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have been permissible under the “automobile exception,” but 
instead obtained a search warrant for the Defendant’s vehicle.49 
COMMENTARY 
Although the Court examined approaches taken in other states 
regarding the adoption of Patane, it did not itself examine the 
possible repercussions of the doctrine.50  The Court admonished the 
police for their repeated failure to provide counsel upon Defendant’s 
request, but noted that it was not the Court’s place to set standards 
for police practices.51  However, to leave such conduct unaddressed 
is to give license to further abuses.52  Indeed, the very bedrock of 
Miranda is an acknowledgment that it is sometimes necessary to 
intervene in police practice in order to protect the constitutional 
rights of the accused.53  The protections in Miranda rested on the 
inherently coercive nature of police interrogations and the difficulty 
for courts in determining whether a confession was truly 
voluntary.54  Patane gives police an incentive to abuse their duty to 
respect a suspect’s Miranda rights by allowing courts to undertake 
a subjective analysis of the coercive nature of any given 
interrogation, opening the door for potentially poisonous fruits to 
reach its lips.55  At the very least, Patane weakens the uniform 
necessity for the police to properly state a suspect’s Miranda rights 
when endeavoring to run a successful investigation.56  As clear as 
the Court’s jurisprudence may be in following the United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fifth Amendment, an issue 
49. Id. at 17. The “automobile exception” to the necessity of police
obtaining a warrant prior to a search is applicable where the police have 
“probable cause to believe that an automobile . . . holds contraband or evidence 
of a crime.” See State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1013–14 (R.I. 1992). 
50. See Beauregard, 198 A.3d at 10–11.
51. Id. at 12.
52. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645–46 (2004) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). 
53. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1966) (“The current
practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our nation’s 
most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to 
incriminate himself.”).  
54. Patane, 542 U.S. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 647.
56. See id.
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of such constitutional dimensions surely deserved a more thorough 
analysis by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine did not extend to physical evidence 
stemming from unwarned and inadmissible, yet voluntary, 
statements because of complimentary jurisprudence on 
interpretation of Rhode Island’s own constitutional self-
incrimination clause with regards to the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, rendering such physical evidence 
admissible at trial. 
Jonathan Stark-Sachs 
